Introduction
Financial markets provide a mechanism through which individuals and …rms are able to transform the cash ‡ows from their economic activities across time and states of nature. The consumption risk sharing literature attempts to provide an overall assessment of the outcomes of these …nancial market linkages by examining how closely consumption allocations conform to the idealized world in which complete contingent claims shield individuals entirely from idiosyncratic variation in their income. The empirical literature on this topic is broad, ranging from microeconomic approaches that study individual income and consumption dynamics using, for example, the U.S. Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) to macroeconomic approaches, using income and product accounts at the national or regional level. Examples of the microeconomic approach are Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) while examples of the macroeconomic approach are Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996) . 1 At the national level, the empirical risk-sharing literature has been mostly focused on the large industrialized countries, due in part to the dominant fraction of world output that they produce, but also because of the relatively short time spans of reliable developing country data available at the time the literature emerged in the early 1990's. This omission has a number of implications. First, the omission is signi…cant in the sense that the welfare implications of risk-sharing for majority of the world's population has not been examined. This omission would also be important for studies of industrialized countries in the sense that while individual developing nations contribute very little to global capital ‡ows, in the aggregate, the ‡ow of capital between developing and developed countries is actually quite large and growing rapidly. Second, given the more volatile and idiosyncratic nature of the business cycles in developing countries, these nations evidently have much more to gain from risksharing with each other and through integration with industrialized countries than industrialized nations gain from pooling risks among themselves. Thus, the welfare implications of risk-sharing may be understated when the focus is placed on the most economically stable nations who share a large common factor in their business cycle variation.
To gain an appreciation for the heterogeneity in business cycle experiences around the world, consider Figure 1 . It plots the standard deviation of the growth rates of consumption and GDP for 161 countries using the Penn World Tables (PWT) over the   sample period 1971 to 2005 . 2 The standard deviation of GDP growth ranges from an astounding 27.5% in Lebanon to a mere 1.88% in the Netherlands; the median country is Samoa (5.16%). The United States, the most scrutinized country in the business cycle literature, is hardly representative, it ranks 149th. OECD nations occupy 16 of the 20 least volatile positions in the ranking. The often-cited business cycle fact that the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption growth relative to output growth is much less than one in the United States is a feat achieved by only 11 of the 161 nations in the PWT (the line at the bottom of the …gure presents this ratio by country along with the U.S. benchmark value of 0.69). The median volatility ratio is 1.18. Note, also, nations with more GDP volatility tend to have more consumption volatility: the correlation of output and consumption volatility across nations is 0.76.
The benchmark international risk-sharing model in which nations pool output endowments in a mutual fund and each nation is allocated consumption in proportion to total world output predicts that consumption volatility will be equalized across countries and furthermore, it will be equal to the variance of world GDP. In the data, however, the median consumption standard deviation is 6.63, four times the standard deviation of world GDP growth of 1.69. 3 The standard deviation of world consumption growth is even lower than that of world GDP growth (1.12) suggesting that extending the endowment version of the risk-sharing model to allow for intertemporal substitution would allow consumption variability fall below output variability by a signi…cant margin. Interestingly the world consumption volatility ratio (to GDP volatility) is 0.66, only slightly lower than the U.S. level. Taken at face value these facts suggest considerable GDP risk at the national level and limited amounts of risk sharing. Below, we provide reduced-form estimates that one-third of national GDP variability is pooled among nations.
With a shift in focus to the full sample of nations of the world it is productive to move from a one-sector macroeconomic model emphasizing the gains from intertemporal trade to a trade model emphasizing variation in the terms of trade. The classic general equilibrium trade model of risk-sharing is Cole and Obstfeld (1991) . In their two-country model, each nation receives a stochastic endowment of a perishable commodity. When the elasticity of substitution across goods is unity, the equilibrium terms of trade and relative endowments move in equal and opposite directions. Consequently, the same consumption allocations arise under …nancial autarky as under complete risk sharing: asset markets are redundant.
We extend the Cole and Obstfeld model in a number of directions to more accurately assess the terms of trade channel. Two crucial theoretical extensions are: i)
to allow multiple producers of each primary commodity and ii) to allow for incomplete specialization. By allowing for multiple producers of each primary commodity, we show that the terms of trade insurance mechanism of the original paper remains in e¤ect for the group of nations (or individuals) that specialize in the production of a primary commodity, but provides absolutely no insurance against idiosyncratic variation in production levels across members of the group producing the same commodity. Allowing for incomplete commodity specialization reduces supply-side risk to the extent shocks are good or sector speci…c, but tends to amplify the impact of nation-speci…c disturbances because the terms of trade e¤ect is muted. Since our focus is on countries most vulnerable to terms of trade risk, we assume the numeraire good (a composite manufactured good) is produced by one 'country'and consider this to be an aggregate of the G-7 nations. The diversi…cation of production across most of the goods in the consumption basket greatly reduces the output and consumption variance of the G-7 group.
Much of the novelty of the analysis lies in the empirical work, which exploits a panel of physical production data of individual primary commodities at both the national and world level. To incorporate the broadest possible picture of the role of commodity prices in the business cycle variation of nations we use a cross-section of 66 countries. The number of countries is substantially lower than the 161 nations available in the PWT which is a limitation forced by the available panel of commodity production and export data. We …nd a very substantial idiosyncratic component to annual production changes, which based on the theory cannot be insured by movements in the terms of trade. In fact, the results are even more stark since by measuring production variation it is possible to examine the covariance of production changes in each country with the relative price of the primary commodities that it exports. This covariance is large and positive in most cases which e¤ectively means that supply changes actually reinforce the e¤ect of relative prices on export earnings, opposite of the Cole and Obstfeld mechanism. Put di¤erently, the primary commodity supply shocks that the Cole and Obstfeld theory focused upon appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
To make this a bit more concrete, consider the international co¤ee market. When the demand for co¤ee on the global market increases due to a world cyclical expansion, what do we expect will happen in individual countries that depend on co¤ee for a large fraction of the income and export earnings? If income elasticities of demand are unitary and the world production possibility frontier is shifting out in a neutral fashion (neutral in the sense of all dimensions of the commodity space), all commodity supplies and demands will increase in the same proportion and relative prices and relative demands will remain unchanged. More of everything is produced and consumed at exactly the same relative prices as before the expansion took place.
A more realistic expectation is that asymmetric movements in prices and quantities will occur, at least in the short-run. In other words, we would expect relative price changes, changes in the terms of trade. This is an empirical question informed in part by the fact that the typical primary commodity relative price is procyclical, extremely volatile and persistent. Thus in a typical global expansion, the income of the co¤ee producer is likely to rise due to a terms of trade improvement, which may be reinforced by a positive supply response. This is not meant to completely downplay the role of commodity supply shocks. Exogenous crop failures do have signi…cant implications for nations that concentrate their production in a few primary commodities. It is also true that the concentration of production is su¢ ciently high that a shock in one or a few locations could move the world price signi…cantly in the manner described by the Cole and Obtsfeld model. Brazil, for example, producers about one-third of the world supply and it together with Colombia and Vietnam, account for more than 50%. Again, an empirical question which our panel data is well-suited to address.
We …nd that the negative correlation between a relative commodity price and its production level needed to provide the endogenous terms of trade risk sharing in the Cole and Obstfeld model, is largely inoperative in the real world. While there are periods in which commodity relative price increases as the relative quantity of its global production falls, these periods and commodities are the exceptions to the rule.
Most of the time the correlation is either ambiguous or positive. Drilling down to the level of a nation makes matter worse since a positive correlation is prevalent consistent with a positive supply response to a terms of trade improvement. In other words, the quantity movements reinforce the relative price movements on export earnings rather than working to mitigate the e¤ect as would be true in the Cole and Obstfeld model.
Finally, the terms of trade are where most of the variance lies in the change in export earnings. This suggests either an inelastic supply curve for the primary commodity due to capacity constraints in the short-run or possibility wealth e¤ects working to o¤set the substitution e¤ects that would typically lead to an expansion of supply.
Overall we …nd that the model predicts high consumption variance in nations that have more volatile terms of trade. Overall, the model accounts for about 15% of the cross-sectional variation in consumption volatility in the data. However, the marginal impact of variation in export revenue is too great: as we move from a country with a 10% predicted consumption standard deviation to twice that level, the increase in consumption standard deviation in the actual data is only about 1.4%, not 10%. As the model assumes complete specialization in primary commodities and abstracts from non-traded goods, it is not surprising that it predicts excess consumption sensitivity to the terms of trade. The main point however, is that the terms of trade is not providing the insurance channel attributed to it by the Cole and Obstfeld benchmark model.
In fact, the data seem to point to an important role for changes in world commodity demand that …rst of all, move relative prices and relative quantities in the same direction, and second of all move relative prices by far more than relative quantities, at least in the short-run. The relatively high variance of price compared to quantity seems inconsistent also with the unitary elasticity of substitution in demand. More plausibly, the elasticity of both demand and supply of primary commodities relative to manufactured goods is quite below unity. Finally, national production changes tend to be dominated by nation-speci…c variation, adding an important idiosyncratic component to national consumption even for producers of the same commodities.
The Data
The macroeconomic data on Gross Domestic Product and private consumption for 
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
When output is modelled as a stochastic and perishable endowment, full risk pooling is achieved by having each nation hold shares in a global mutual fund paying dividends equal to world GDP. A natural starting for a discussion of international risk sharing, therefore, is a variance decomposition of world output.
World GDP growth is de…ned as a country-size weighted average of national GDP growth rates:
where y it is the logarithm of real GDP (Layspeyres) for country i, and i is the fraction of the world GDP produced by country i, on average over the period 1971 to 2005. Due to the large number of countries, it is economical to use a non-standard variance decomposition:
Dividing through by both sides by the variance of world output growth leads to the variance decomposition:
where i cov( y t ; y it )=var( y t ). By construction, the country-size weighted average is 1.
The U.S. ranks …rst in this variance decomposition, which is not very surprising.
What is surprising is that the U.S. accounts for 35% of the variance despite producing only 23% of world output (the U.S. share of world GDP in the PWT data). The di¤erence re ‡ects that fact that the beta of the U.S. is 1.52. Put di¤erently, while the U.S. may have one of the most stable growth rates in the world, it is more volatile than world GDP and has a high covariance with world GDP, thus giving it a beta far in excess of 1. The fact that the income betas are very di¤erent from unity suggests considerable scope for international risk-sharing. For evidence on the extent to which risk-sharing occurs, the consumption side of the ledger is relevant. The analogous variance decomposition of world consumption is, 1 = P i i i , where i cov( c t ; c it )=var( c t ).
As is well-known, complete risk-sharing in the one-sector endowment economy implies the equality of marginal utility across nations. Moreover, under the assumption that consumption is separable from other arguments of the utility function and takes the form, (1 ) 1 c
1
, complete international risk-sharing implies: c t = c it .
In terms of the world consumption growth variance decomposition this means the distribution of the 's is degenerate: i = 1: 
Commodity Market Fluctuations
Developing countries would seem to be the ideal setting in which to investigate the Cole and Obstfeld proposition that the positive wealth e¤ects of an increase in the physical output of a commodity are completely o¤set by a deterioration in the terms of trade. Developing nations are typically highly specialized in exports. Moreover the physical quantity of primary commodity production is arguably more susceptible to exogenous sources of variation than is true of manufactured goods and services produced in industrialized nations.
The properties of commodity price ‡uctuations have been thoroughly documented.
The typical primary commodity price ‡uctuates by an order of magnitude more than other goods or services in the CPI basket. Economists continue to debate whether they are random walks or cointegrated with the price level. 6 Less is known about the evolution of the quantity of world production and we know of no study that investigates nation-speci…c variation in production levels. This section intends to …ll these gaps in the literature before examining their risk-sharing implications in the next section.
World commodity price and quantity indices
The panel data consist of spot U.S. dollar prices and physical production of 33 primary commodities. The price data are U.S. dollar spot prices from centralized exchanges.
the production data are physical production by major producers and an estimate of world production level.
The analysis begins at the level of world commodity price and quantity indices, each constructed using sample average production value weights, denoted j :
where P jt is the international price of commodity j in year t and Y jt is world physical production of commodity j in the same year. The commodity price and quantity indices are de…ned as:
where lowercase variables are logarithms of their uppercase counterparts (thus the indices should be viewed as geometric averages of the micro-data with production shares as the weights).
The commodity price index is trending over time due to in ‡ation (in U.S. dollar terms) while the commodity quantity index is trending due to the interactions of economic growth and technological innovation. The presumption is that economic growth increases the demand of primary commodities while technological innovation allows producers to economize on these inputs or develop substitutes for the over time. For this reason, we normalized by the U.S. CPI for the price index (p t ) and we normalized by world real GDP (y t ) for the quantity index. We refer to these as the relative price and relative quantity indices in what follows and denote them by:
p ct = e p ct p t and y ct = e y ct y t , respectively. 
Deconstruction of world commodity price and quantity indices
It is tempting to relate the annual changes in relative commodity prices to the patterns of business cycle heterogeneity documented in Figure 1 . As we move up only the business cycle volatility pro…le of nations in Figure 1 the concentration of output and particularly exports is rising, suggesting an important role for commodity prices is elevating the volatility of GDP and consumption in small, developing nations, compared to large industrialized ones.
Since primary exports of developing countries tend to be highly concentrated in a single or small number of items, it is instructive to begin this investigation by decomposing the variance of the world commodity relative price and quantity indices into the contributions of individual commodities using the same variance decomposition method employed earlier. The variance decomposition of the commodity price index is thus:1 = P j j jc , where j is once again the production value weight of commodity j and jc = cov( p jt ; p ct )=var( p ct ) is the contribution of commodity j's relative price to the world relative price index before share-weighting. Here we de…ne p jt = e p jt p t as the change in the logarithm of the U.S. dollar price of commodity j, e p jt , relative to U.S. CPI in ‡ation (to be consistent with our de…nition of p ct ). The analogous variance decomposition of the quantity index is:1 = P j j jc , where jc = cov( y jt ; y ct )=var( y ct ): Table 1 presents the variance decomposition on both an equal and productionvalue-weighted basis. When commodities are weighted equally in the price index, commodities such as oranges and corn oil contribute far more than the average good and petroleum contributes considerably less. When world production value weights are used the picture changes because petroleum has a production value share of 36% compared to 3.3% under equal weighting. On a production value-weighted basis, oil now accounts for about 68% of the variance of the commodity price index changes, twice its production share. Only eight other commodities account for 1% or more of the commodity price variance: corn oil, eggs, iron, milk, rice, soybeans, sugar and wheat. Table 2 presents the variance decomposition on both an equal and production-value-weighted basis. Some parallels and some di¤erences emerge in a comparison of price and quantity indices. Petroleum stands out much less starkly in the valued weighted commodity quantity index, accounting about one-third of the variation, which happens to match it's value share. The other di¤erence between the price and quantity data is that unlike commodity prices, the production levels tend to move more independently of one another. There are even some production levels which have a negative covariance with the aggregate, such as iron, oranges, petroleum, tallow and zinc. This means there is more averaging out of quantity changes across commodities than is true of price changes. This is suggestive of a signi…cant role for commodity-speci…c supply shocks. We turn, next, to nation-speci…c patterns of specialization and production changes.
National and World Commodity Supplies
Bidarkota and Crucini (2000) investigated the consumption risks faced by primary commodity-exporting developing countries under the assumption that the quantity of production was constant since they lacked production data by country. This section explores the cross-sectional and time series properties of commodity production by major world producers.
For each of our 33 primary commodities we have annual production data for major producers and total world production. The distinction between world and nation-speci…c variation is important for our analysis. Changes in the world supply of commodities is arguably related to changes in world demand and the equilibrium supply responses those changes invoke. Changes in commodity supply at the level of a country relative to the world level are arguably related to exogenous supply shocks speci…c to the country. Figure 6 plots the national market shares of co¤ee production. Brazil and Columbia combined account for about 60% of world production in 1960, followed by a secular decline to about 50% by the mid-1970's. By the end of the sample Vietnam has risen from being a marginal producer to contributing a share comparable to
Columbia. There is considerable annual variation in the share of Brazil's production. 
The Model
The starting point of discussion is the seminal paper by Cole and Obstfeld (1991) , who developed a sharp theoretical benchmark for commodity risk sharing. Speci…cally, in an endowment economy setting with complete specialization and Cobb-Douglas pref-erences, they demonstrated that in a two-country world, the movement of a nation's terms of trade was su¢ cient to make …nancial markets redundant.
The economic mechanism works as follows. The …rst country specializes in X and the second in Y . In a frictionless world, with Cobb-Douglas preferences, the relative price of the two goods is P Consider a world populated by a large developed block, the OECD, and a smaller block of developing countries who are specialized in the production of a single primary commodity. Note that while each country may be specialized, there may be more than one specialist in each good.
The maximization problem of country i, specializing in production of commodity j is:
subject to :
P jt Y jt is the value the single exported commodity fetches on world markets, but could, in general, be thought of as the market value of the entire export basket of country i with appropriate de…nitions of the aggregates. The demand for good k, by country i, is:
Taking a geometric weighted average across commodities gives:
The last line indicates that appropriately de…ned aggregate real consumption index, C it , and consumer price index, P t when multiplied, equal nominal income accruing to country i from selling commodity j, up to a scalar normalization. 7 
Model Implications
Since aggregate consumption, so de…ned, maps into welfare and wealth, what we would like to know is how consumption changes with relative prices and endowments.
Taking the …rst-di¤erence of the logarithm of the last equation and denoting logarithms of upper-case variables as lower-case variables, we have:
In words: changes in aggregate consumption of country i, consist of a terms of trade e¤ect, e p jt p t , and an endowment e¤ect. The terms of trade e¤ect is the change in the value of the endowment relative to the change in the value of value of the consumption basket, at the initial endowment level. The endowment e¤ect is the change in physical quantity produced, which at …xed prices leads to a proportional change in aggregation consumption. The volatility of consumption thus, depends on the variance of the terms of trade and production as well as the covariance between the two. The covariance term is a key element of the Cole and Obtsfeld asset market redundancy result.
To see this, consider a pair of countries each specializing in a particular good and noting how relative prices and quantities behave in equilibrium. Noting that price level in ‡ation is: p t = 1 e p 1t + 2 e p 2t , the consumption growth rate of country 1 and 2 (from (9)) are given by: and the consumption growth di¤erential is:
The last equality holds by virtue of the fact that relative prices and relative quantities move in proportion and in opposite directions and the market value changes cancel.
Thus consumption moves one-for-one across countries as implied by risk-sharing despite the fact that no risk are pooled ex ante: the terms of trade does all the work.
The problem in applying this result in practice is that it actually is referring to good-speci…c risk, not country-speci…c risk. In the model with complete specialization in production the two are the same, but in practice they are not. Recall Figure 6 and 7 with the national levels of co¤ee and petroleum production across producers of the world. To see what happens when countries remain specialized, but there are multiple producers of the two goods (less goods than countries). 8 Let the output of country i of commodity j, y ijt , consist of both a country-speci…c and commodity-speci…c shock, y jt , and an idiosyncratic shocks speci…c to both the commodity and the country, ijt ,
where E i (y ijt ) = y jt is the commodity speci…c component, while ijt capture i.i.d.
deviations from this level across countries that produce good j.
Aggregate consumption in country i, still has the terms of trade component, but now the quantity must be indexed by the good and country to re ‡ect the nationspeci…c component of the endowment:
Consider, now, two randomly selected countries, a and b, that produce goods, 1 and 2, respectively, subject to idiosyncratic as well as nation-speci…c risk, the previous result becomes (after trivial substitutions):
Substituting the country-speci…c realizations with their assumed stochastic processes gives us:
and using the relationship between relative prices and quantities in the Cobb-Douglas formulation, gives:
Remarkably, each country bears all of its idiosyncratic risks! What has happened to the risk-sharing facet of movements in the terms of trade?
Essentially, the relative price movements of one commodity to another still provide insurance, but the group that is insured is an industry that producers that good. This is easily demonstrated by averaging the consumption allocations across individuals who specialize in di¤erent sectors:
In words: equilibrium terms of trade adjustments insure the producers who happen to have a change in production exactly equal to the world sectoral changes. Thus, in the absence of ex ante risk-sharing, all idiosyncratic output deviations are completely born by the individual countries. Note also, that if all sector risks are idiosyncratic to the nation, the terms of trade will be constant and all risks will be borne by the individual producers.
The extent to which national production level move with the world aggregate and in response to the terms of trade is an empirical question, which are data allow us to investigate in detail in the next section.
Consumption risk-sharing and the terms of trade
This section applies the logic of the Cole-Obtsfeld model, extended to the case of nonspecialization, to conduct a variance decomposition. The variance decomposition is that of national consumption growth relative to world consumption growth with the variance allocated to terms of trade variation, world production variation and national production variation.
The starting point is the construction of the commodity terms of trade from world commodity relative prices and national commodity export data. Toward this end, each country's terms of trade is constructed as an export-share-weighted index of changes in primary commodity relative prices, p it = e p it p t :
Recall, p jt is, as before, the U.S. dollar price of commodity j in world markets relative to the U.S. CPI. Thus when p jt is positive, commodity j's in ‡ation exceeds that of the U.S. consumption basket (which is treated as the import de ‡ator), indicating a terms of trade improvement. The ! ij are country and commodity-speci…c export weights computed from our panel:
Note that the use of common, as opposed to country-speci…c commodity prices on the right-hand-side of the index construction assumes that the Law-of-One-Price holds internationally for these goods and for the basket of imports.
We return, now, to the logic of the CO model. Recall the generic equation for consumption growth for country i producing commodity j is c it = ( e p jt p t ) + y jt .
The case of non-specialization replaces the j subscripts with i subscripts indicating the terms of trade and production value of country i, given its pattern of specialization
Aggregating across all countries gives the deviation of consumption growth of country i relative to world consumption growth, which represents the deviation from complete risk sharing:
The goal is to decompose these deviations from complete risk-sharing, c it c t , into microeconomic sources of risk based on available data. The variance of the change in consumption of country i relative to the world (the G-7 supplier of manufactured goods) is:
This should be viewed as the amount of commodity revenue risk to be shared after taking into account non-diversi…able movements in world consumption or income and allowing for covariances among variables to o¤set some of the underlying risks. One such mechanism is the negative covariance of the terms of trade with aggregate world output of a commodity highlighted in the CO model.
To ensure a full variance decomposition other sources of consumption variation are ignored and the focus is on decomposing the right-hand-side which is, given our data, nominal commodity export earnings relative to nominal world GDP. Drilling down to the commodity level on the right-hand-side, we have:
= terms of trade + world production + nation-speci…c production and the resulting variance decomposition, in terms of the -method is:
captures the pure terms of trade e¤ect, the change in value of the exported commodity holding physical production …xed at steady-state shares (! ij ). yj = cov( y jt y t ; x it )=var( x it ) captures the common world changes in the production for commodity j, relative to world GDP. yij = cov( y ijt y jt ; x it )=var( x it ) captures the contribution of nationspeci…c changes in the production of commodity j, i.e., relative to world commodity production of that commodity. Table 3 reports the results of this variance decomposition focusing on the top exported commodity of each country in our panel. We focus on the top commodity since this commodity accounts for three-fourths of the variation in our primary export variable for the median country and virtual all of the variation for half of the countries.
Variation in the terms of trade is by far the dominant contributor to export earnings, accounting for about 82% of the variance for the median country. The terms of trade of the top exported commodity alone accounts for about two-thirds of this variation.
The next most important contributor to export earnings variability is the nationspeci…c component of the quantity of primary commodities produced, at 15% for the median country. Again, the top export accounts for the bulk of this variation. World supply variation is quite trivial with a median absolute value contribution of about 3.5%.
Approximately one in three countries have a negative contribution of world production, which is consistent with the terms of trade channel of Cole and Obstfeld, but the magnitude of this variation is so modest that it contributes very little to the overall variance. Nation-speci…c production changes are overwhelmingly positive contributors to variability. This means countries tend to increase their production when the terms of trade improves, suggestive of an endogenous supply response and thus reinforcing the e¤ect of terms of trade variation. Figure 8 plots the decomposition of the predicted variance of c it c t into the contribution of the terms of trade, national production and world production for each country in the cross-section. While it is obvious that the terms of trade dominates the variance decomposition in most countries, there are a substantial majority of cases in which changes in domestic production relative to world production is the dominant factor. For twenty nations variation in the physical production of the top export commodity accounts for more than 20% of the total predicted variation. Figure 9 plots the actual standard deviation of consumption growth against the predicted variance of consumption growth, excluding outliers. 9 A linear regression produces a slope coe¢ cient of 0.14 and an R 2 of 16%. That the two are strongly positively correlated despite the fact that many sources of consumption variation are ignored is evidence of the importance of these commodity terms of trade changes and supply responses. There are many reasons that the coe¢ cient is less than unity:
most countries in the sample produce some manufactured goods as well as non-traded goods, for example.
Conclusion
The heterogeneity of business cycles across countries outside the large industrialized ones is vast. The hypothesis put forward here is that a substantial fraction of this heterogeneity re ‡ects a concentration of exports in a single or very few primary commodities. We estimate this fraction to be about 16%.
Specialization in primary commodities poses risks that are signi…cant due to the highly volatile and unpredictable nature of world commodity prices. These risks may be further ampli…ed when production is also somewhat beyond the control of individuals and …rms, due to weather and national policy instability or when the short-term elasticity of supply is signi…cant.
The implications of these trade patterns for the long-run was emphasized by Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) who documented a secular decline in relative commodity prices and later in the immiserizing growth theory of Bhagwati (1958) . Business cycle implications of the terms of trade have been studied by Kose (2002) , Kouparitsas (1997) and Mendoza (1995) . These studies have focused on the aggregate terms of trade and also abstracted from idiosyncratic movements in production in the crosssection of countries specializing in the same commodity.
The focus here has been to emphasize the heterogeneity across countries and the role of individual primary commodities in shaping the heterogeneity through idiosyncratic production shifts across countries by commodity. We …nd evidence that national production responses almost always magnify, rather than dampen the impact of commodity price movements on a nation's export earnings. In other words, while there may be a risk-sharing e¤ect in terms of negative comovements of commodity relative supplies and commodity relative prices at the world level, this e¤ect is swamped by a positive covariance of national production and the relative price of the export commodity which ampli…es export earnings variation. It could be that the elastic supply responses of developing countries are themselves enhanced by underlying risk-sharing arrangements in accord with the theoretical work of Baxter and Crucini (1995) . Further study is needed to investigate this possibility.
Our analysis is subject to a number of important caveats. In particular, the import-side of the trade balance has been broad-brushed. We assumed all countries import a common consumption basket in exchange for a small number of exported primary commodities. It will be interesting to measure the import side of the trade balance more carefully and incorporate imports of primary commodity as inputs into production. The analysis above has also abstracted from dynamic considerations, including permanent income theory, capital accumulation, credit market frictions and interest rate movements. Each of these facets are extensions in progress. Much remains to be done.
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Notes
1 See Hess and van Wincoop (2000) for insightful comparisons of approaches at the regional and national level. 2 Using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter gives qualitatively similar results.
3 World GDP and consumption growth are computed as a country-size weighted averages of national GDP and consumption growth, respectively. The country size weights used are the averages over the sample period. 4 See the data appendix for more details about data sources and index construction. 5 The reader will recognize that the international business cycle liteature has shown how di¢ cult it is to reduce the consumption correlation below unity under risk pooling even when assumptions such as separable utility is relaxed and preference shocks are introduced. 6 See Chih-Wei Wang (2011) for evidence on persistence of commodity prices relative to the CPI and the role of permanent and transitory shocks in the evolution of nominal commodity prices. 7 Speci…cally,
8 It may seem odd to have the number of countries exceed the number of goods rather than the reverse, but this is more a consequence of the arbitrariness of using countries as the unit of account than the thrust of our argument. The important point is that we break the singularity of country and sector shocks. 9 The …gure and regression line do not include extreme outliers of the distribution, countries with terms of trade standard deviations in excess of 40% (Portugal, El Salvador, Uganda, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Kuwait, Ethiopia, Ecuador, Colombia, Morocco, Senegal) and countries with consumption growth standard deviations exceeding 10% (Saudi Arabia, Nigeria). 
